Emergent phenomena are quite interesting and amazing, but they present two main scientific obstacles: to be rationally understood and to be mathematically modelled. In this paper we propose a powerful mathematical tool for modelling emergent phenomena by applying category theory. Furthermore, since great part of biological phenomena are emergent, we present an essay of how to access an emergence from observational data. In the mathematical perspective, we utilize constructs (categories whose objects are structured sets), their operations and their corresponding generalized (...) underlying functor (which are not necessarily faithful) to define emergence. From this definition, we elaborate several results concerning homomorphism between emergences, representability, pull-back, push-out, equalizer, product and co-product of emergences among other results. After we have presented such mathematical model, we utilize a hierarchical structure as example—from molecules to a flatworm—, in order to understand the relation between biological systems and its underlying emergence in a hierarchical model. (shrink)

Aristotle considers all examples, as far as they are used as rhetorical arguments, to be inductions . On the other hand, he finds it worthwhile to distinguish different kinds of examples . Moreover, comparisons and fables are said to be “made” by the orator, whereas historical examples are not . The present article attempts to explain this opposition.A close examination of what can be meant by “induction” reveals that this term applies differently to historical examples and to comparisons and fables. (...) In a broader sense, all examples can be called inductions, insofar as a certain logical relation, different from the syllogistic one, obtains between conclusion and premises. This relation, however, is unable to explain why examples can serve as arguments. Applied to historical examples only, the term “induction” preserves its original meaning of checking samples in a number sufficient to yield generalization. In its narrow sense, “induction” gives a satisfactory account of how historical examples work. As for comparisons and fables — to which “induction” applies in a broader sense only — Aristotle fails to explain what makes them arguments. The explanation, missing in Rhetoric 2, 20, can, however, be given according to the general lines of Aristotelian dialectics and rhetorics. The main task of comparison and fable is to elaborate a so far unconsidered middle term meeting the following conditions: the hearer is prepared to agree that M applies to the subject of the conclusion and that the predicate of the conclusion applies to M. All examples make use of a general proposition from which their conclusion can be inferred. Historical examples produce instances, in order to confirm a proposition previously admitted as suitable premise, provided that its truth can be proved. Comparison and fables, by introducing a new middle term, try to form a premise susceptible of being admitted without proof. (shrink)

La conceptualización y el marco legal del odio en las democracias contemporáneas están en el centro de la atención por su proximidad al problema de la libertad de expresión. La reciente migración del discurso público de ambientes desconectados a escenarios en línea nos obliga a adoptar enfoques más penetrantes en esta cuestión, para entender cómo las dinámicas de género se reproducen entre los usuarios de internet. El artículo ofrece una aproximación legal, desde una perspectiva de género, al odio tal y (...) como aparece en la legislación internacional y europea, con el fin de comparar las legislaciones de Italia y España. El objetivo es mediar el conflicto entre libertad de expresión y los compromisos que los Estados asumen para dotar a específicos sujetos de protección contra formas de violencia de género que ocurren en internet. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to argue that abductive reasoning is part of a cognitive process of interpreting something as being something. The paper holds two fundamental claims. First, it proposes a definition of interpretation as a type of cognitive event. Second, it is argued that in some cases the activity of interpreting is a process to search for plausible assumptions for consistent explanatory hypotheses formation. As a result of these two theses, it is concluded that logic of interpretation (...) could enrich and extend the study of so-called reproduction or hypothesis generation. The treatment given here to abduction is contrasted and integrated into the history of studies on logical pattern of abduction and its applications. (shrink)